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Abstract
Unemployment insurance funds (the ‘Ghent system’), subsidized by the state and controlled by 
the labour movement, have contributed to high trade union densities in the Nordic countries. 
However, dependence on these funds as a recruiting mechanism makes trade union membership 
sensitive to institutional changes to unemployment insurance benefits and the institutional set-
up surrounding and regulating them. In this article, we investigate recent institutional changes 
in the three Nordic countries following the Ghent model, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, and 
analyse the consequences for union and fund membership. These countries have witnessed 
different combinations of two types of reform, less attractive unemployment benefits plus new 
institutional alternatives to the traditional union-run funds, and this has led to different outcomes 
in each country. Benefit retrenchment and increased contributions led to a sharp decline in fund 
membership in Sweden, whereas this trend is less pronounced in Finland and Denmark. Instead, 
the main trend here has been a shift from union-led to alternative forms of fund membership, but 
in different ways.
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Introduction: institutional change and new trajectories for 
unionization
Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Iceland have the world’s highest trade union densities. 
Research has linked this to the Nordic unemployment insurance system based on volun-
tary membership in an unemployment insurance fund (UIF) controlled by trade unions 
and subsidized by the state (Høgedahl, 2014; Lind, 2004, 2009). Cross-national studies 
have documented the contribution of UIFs to a high union density (Rothstein, 1992; 
Scruggs, 2002; Western, 1994). More recent research has described the deterioration of 
the unemployment benefits provided by the UIFs in terms of coverage, eligibility and the 
right of entitlement, making membership less attractive and eroding the UIFs as a recruit-
ing mechanism for the trade unions (Kjellberg, 2006, 2009; Lind, 2004, 2009; Böckerman 
& Uusitalo, 2006). It is evident that ‘institutions matter’ when it comes to unionization 
and that political and institutional changes made to the system are connected to declining 
trade union densities in the Nordic Ghent countries.
However, as we argue in this article, different types of institutional changes to the 
Ghent system in the Nordic countries lead to different outcomes. We offer an account of 
the Nordic Ghent systems in terms of both the welfare and labour market institutions 
underpinning the system, a cross-national overview absent in the literature. We find a 
variation in institutional changes between Denmark, Sweden and Finland, creating dif-
ferent trajectories away from the ‘classic’ Ghent system based on a dual membership of 
a UIF and a trade union. Declining union density is a common trend, but the severity of 
this decline varies across the Ghent countries. We also find nationally distinct patterns in 
new combinations of UIF and trade union membership. We trace these patterns back to 
combinations of different reforms. Broadly, some changes concern the unemployment 
benefit systems while others have created new alternatives to the traditional dual mem-
bership of a union and a UIF. The research question guiding our investigation is, ‘Are the 
Nordic Ghent countries following different trajectories away from the classic dual 
membership?’
We begin by presenting the data and method applied in our study. We then present the 
analytic framework illustrated by different trajectories away from classic Ghent systems, 
in which we connect two types of policy changes. We next turn to an analysis of the 
specific changes made to unemployment benefits and the institutional set-up surround-
ing the Ghent systems, and link the institutional changes to different outcomes, outlining 
how each country takes a different trajectory away from the classic Ghent constellation 
based on dual membership. Finally, we summarize our concluding remarks.
The Nordic Ghent systems: an institutionalist approach
While institutional characteristics always differ to some degree across any country cases, 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland are usually grouped within the same ‘regime’ or ‘model’ 
in both welfare and labour market research (Andersen et al., 2014; Arts and Gelissen, 
2010; Dølvik et al., 2015; Kongshøj, 2014). To some extent, we adopt the causal reason-
ing behind the classic ‘most-similar’ case design, in which differences among similar 
cases are attributed to more specific differences. However, there is a world of case 
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designs beyond the standard most-similar/most-different designs (Gerring and Cojocaru, 
2016). It is often forgotten that Mill outlined three other logics of causality in compara-
tive case studies. Among these, his ‘concomitant variation’ also captures our aim: it 
describes how a central outcome may vary by degrees across cases, which can be traced 
back to some explanatory factor varying according to the same pattern. In this case, we 
are interested in how the general decline in fund membership and unionization rates has 
varied across the three countries, and we aim to connect this to a corresponding pattern 
of reforms of benefits and new alternatives to the ‘classic’ package of fund and union 
membership in the Ghent countries.
Despite broad similarities and ‘concomitant’ variations in unionization and institu-
tional reform, there are also other possible explanations for union decline. Economic 
cycles, structural changes in labour market composition and ‘individualization’ are fac-
tors commonly discussed in the literature (Schnabel, 2013; Visser, 2002). Macroeconomic 
developments have certainly been different in the three countries in the period covered 
here. However, trends in unionization do not match these potential ‘concomitant varia-
tions’. While economic growth in Denmark and Finland has been among the worst in the 
OECD, particularly after the crisis, Sweden has been among the better performers 
(OECD, 2016a). While employment increased somewhat in Sweden in the new millen-
nium, it has declined in Denmark and in Finland after the crisis years (OECD, 2016b). If 
it is assumed that the labour force responds to labour market risks, this could be seen as 
a reason why union density has declined most in Sweden. Yet densities have stabilized in 
all three countries in the post-crisis years. This does not seem to match the economic 
divergence between Sweden on the one hand and Denmark and Finland on the other, 
which has been more pronounced after the crisis.
In terms of ‘de-industrialization’, trends are roughly similar across the three coun-
tries, with a decline in industrial employment from around 25 percent of total employ-
ment in 2000 to about 20 percent today (Eurostat, 2016). ‘Individualization’ as a driver 
of declining unionization is difficult to operationalize convincingly (Caraker et al., 
2015); suffice it to say that in most descriptive cross-country assessments of cultural 
values (as based on the World Value Survey), all Nordic countries have shown high lev-
els of ‘individualism’ (Bonikowski, 2010; Inglehart and Baker, 2000).
Of course such explanations may be important factors behind the general and incre-
mental decline in union membership rates. Yet, as we show below, they can be difficult 
to match with the intra-Nordic differences. This is one reason why we emphasize the 
differences in institutional reforms, as well as the fact that the institutions underpinning 
the Ghent system have long been recognized as very important for fund membership. 
Therefore, it should be clear that approach reflects the ‘new’ institutionalist approach in 
which (policy) institutions partly determine the preferences or values of actors (Fioretos 
et al., 2016), although neo-institutionalists differ on how this process takes place.
With the data available, the causality between institutional reforms and changes in 
unionization is difficult to isolate. In the absence of directly comparable cross-country 
data sets, the best that can be done is to give an updated cross-national account of insti-
tutional reforms in the Ghent systems and to show comparable data for fund membership 
both with and without the new alternatives that do not combine the classic Ghent pack-
age of fund and union membership (which has not been shown in previous literature). 
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Our data stem from various sources. First, the analysis of institutional changes is based 
on desk research of relevant policy documents in the three countries. Second, UIF mem-
bership data have been collected from the Danish Agency for Labour Market and 
Recruitment (Styrelsen for Arbejdsmarked og Rekruttering, STAR), the Swedish 
Unemployment Insurance Board (Inspektionen för arbetslöshetsförsäkringen, IAF), and 
the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finanssivalvonta, Fiva). OECD labour 
force data are used to calculate UIF densities. While the account of institutional reforms 
includes changes from the 1990s and onwards, the data on UIF density cover a more 
recent timespan, from the early 2000s, because of constraints on comparable data distin-
guishing between different forms of UIF membership. However, it is also in this period 
that clear intra-Nordic differences in trajectories away from the classic Ghent package of 
double membership emerge.
The link between UIFs, trade unions and the new 
trajectories
A number of multivariate cross-sectional studies have shown that the Ghent system 
countries enjoy a substantial advantage in unionization (Brandl, 2009; Ebbinghaus and 
Visser, 1999; Wallerstein and Western, 2000). As Rothstein (1992: 39) put it, ‘while the 
choice of whether or not to join a union is a free choice, the rationality in the decision 
can be severely affected by the operation of government labour-market institutions’. 
Schnabel (2013) has shown that the decline in union density between 1980 and 2010 was 
27 percentage points lower in countries with a Ghent system; indeed densities actually 
climbed until the 1990s in the Nordic countries, as Figure 1 shows.
Figure 1. Union density in the Nordic countries (%).a
Source: OECD.Stat.
a‘Alternative’ unions included in the Danish case.
Høgedahl and Kongshøj 5
All Nordic countries except Norway, which since 1938 has operated a compulsory 
system (Nergaard and Stokke, 2007), still maintain a Ghent system where insurance 
against unemployment is based on voluntary UIF membership. It is worth noting that 
union density in Norway has been steady at round 55 percent for the past 15 years, which 
is consistent with the argument that declining trade union density in the Nordic Ghent 
countries is related to institutional changes to unemployment insurance benefits and the 
institutional arrangements governing the UIFs.
It is important to emphasize that in general there are no legal obligations for 
wage-earners to join a trade union in order to access a UIF in any of the three Nordic 
Ghent countries (Kjellberg, 2006; Lind, 2009; Uusitalo and Bockerman, 2005). 
However, research shows that workers often associate trade union and UIF member-
ship: surveys show that many indicate ‘in order to become [a] member of a UIF’ as 
an important reason for joining their present trade union (Caraker et al., 2015; Ibsen 
et al., 2011). This strong institutional link between the trade union and the associated 
UIF is often referred to as a ‘Ghent effect’ (Clasen and Viebrock, 2008; Høgedahl, 
2014).
Most wage-earners in the Nordic Ghent countries are therefore dual members of both 
a trade union and a union-controlled UIF. Table 1 illustrates the possible combinations 
among membership of a recognized or ‘official’ union which negotiates one or more 
national collective agreements with employer organizations, membership of an alterna-
tive or independent union, and non-membership; and membership of an ‘official’ UIF, an 
alternative UIF, or non-membership. Cell 1 can be described as the ‘classic’ membership 
constellation of the Ghent system. However, one of the trajectories away from the classic 
membership constellation is the rise of alternative or independent trade unions, and a 
second is the introduction of independent or alternative UIFs.
Hence, there is now a variety of alternative combinations in the Nordic Ghent coun-
tries besides the ‘classic’ dual membership in an ‘official’ trade union and its associated 
UIF. Employees could always choose to join a UIF without joining a trade union (cell 3) 
in Table 1. But institutional changes have also opened up new alternatives by introducing 
independent UIFs or by allowing alternative UIFs to join the market. In Sweden, Alfa-
kassan is an example of an independent UIF with no trade union associated (Kjellberg, 
2006, 2014); the same goes for Yleinen Työttömyyskassa (YTK) in Finland (Uusitalo and 
Bockerman, 2005). In Denmark, however, alternative UIFs (or ‘yellow UIFs’) have 
Table 1. Combinations of trade union and UIF membership in the Nordic Ghent countries.
Trade union membership
 Recognized Independent None
Recognized union UIF 1 2 3
Independent UIF 4 5 6
None 7 8 9
UIF: unemployment insurance fund.
Fewer than 10 percent of employees choose options (7) and (8); the main exceptions are civil servants with 
high employment protection. Options (2) and (4) are also uncommon.
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associated alternative trade unions. However, their characteristic feature is that they are 
not, or are only in very few instances, parties to collective agreements and can therefore 
only offer a package consisting of a UIF and individual services, yet at a significantly 
lower price than the official organizations (Ibsen et al., 2013). The alternative UIFs, like 
the independent ones, are not restricted by any occupational or sectoral demarcation lines 
and therefore are open for all workers.
Since trade unions in the Nordic countries are very much dependent on their associ-
ated UIF, they are also very sensitive towards any institutional changes made to the 
system. We focus on two different types of change. The first comprises political reforms 
of unemployment insurance benefits in terms of compensation rate, duration, eligibility 
and the level of state financing; and also the relationship between unemployment insur-
ance benefits and alternative social assistance. In theory, such changes can make a UIF 
less attractive and consequently erode its role as a recruiting mechanism for their associ-
ated trade unions, leaving more workers to choose the option in cell 9. Second, reforming 
the institutional arrangements regulating the UIFs. These types of institutional change 
include policies allowing new UIFs to enter the ‘market’ for UIFs. The consequences of 
such changes are more diverse, ranging from sole membership of new UIFs (cell 6) and 
dual membership of alternative unions and their associated UIF (cell 5).
The erosion of unemployment insurance benefits
The unemployment benefit systems of Denmark and Sweden had had distinct core traits 
(Goul Andersen, 2012; Torp, 1999), whereas Finland was more of a Nordic outlier (Arts 
and Gelissen, 2010; Kongshøj, 2014). First, unemployment insurance benefits in 
Denmark and Sweden were relatively generous but also de facto at a flat rate for most 
employees (with generous formal replacement rates combined with low ceilings for 
maximum benefits). Second, these benefits were overwhelmingly tax-financed, with 
very limited contributions by fund members themselves. Third, they had very high cov-
erage among the total number of unemployed: at least 75 percent, but usually more. 
Fourth, social assistance played a more marginal role for the unemployed (given high 
unemployment insurance coverage), but these benefits were also relatively generous. 
Below we examine how each of these traits has eroded or changed over time.
Benefit generosity
The generosity of unemployment benefits has declined in all three countries since the 
1990s, especially in Sweden; like Denmark, it had a replacement rate of 90 percent up to 
the benefit ceiling, but in 1993 this was lowered to 80 percent (Goul Andersen, 2012; 
Sjöberg, 2011). In 2007, this was further reduced to 70 percent after 200 days of unem-
ployment and 65 percent after 300 days. In addition, the indexation of the ceiling was 
abolished in 1993, and up to 2015 it was adjusted upwards only twice (though the new 
Social Democratic government then raised it from 18,800 to 25,000 SEK a year). 
Whereas Sweden previously had the most generous benefits in the Nordic countries 
because of its relatively high ceiling, they became the least generous until the 2015 
increase (OECD, 2016c; Van Vliet and Caminada, 2012). For instance, the net 
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replacement rate for the average production worker was below 60 percent in 2012, as 
against some 90 percent in the early 1990s.
Denmark did not see a similar reduction in generosity, although the benefit ceiling has 
also declined somewhat in real terms (Kongshøj, 2014). The effects of a benefit freeze in 
the mid-1980s were more instantly noticeable. For the average production worker, net 
replacement rates fell by some 12 percentage points from the early 1990s.
Benefits in Finland are much more earnings-related, since there is no benefit ceiling 
(only a reduced benefit formula for incomes above a level close to the average wage) 
(Kela, 2015). Benefit levels declined markedly in the 1990s as price indexation was sus-
pended until 2002, following a severe economic crisis (Ervasti, 2002; Lilja and Savaja, 
1999). Benefits have largely kept pace in the new millennium and were even raised for 
initial unemployment spells (dependent on work history) or participation in active labour 
market measures (Kela, 2015; Uusitalo and Verho, 2010).
Financing
Until the 1990s, employee contributions constituted only around 5 percent of expendi-
tures in Sweden and Finland, and around 20 percent in Denmark (Jørgensen, 2007; Torp, 
1999). However, they have risen particularly significantly in Sweden, where a 2007 
reform sharply increased and differentiated contributions. The same reform completely 
abolished the previous 40-percent tax deduction for UIF contributions (alongside the 
25% deduction for union membership). Previously, state financing was weighted towards 
occupations and sectors with higher unemployment; now this was largely eliminated. 
Thus on average, contributions were increased by about a third, but for funds with high 
unemployment levels the increase was up to 59 percent (Berglund and Esser, 2013; Goul 
Andersen, 2012; Sjöberg, 2011). This coincided with the lowering of the benefit ceiling, 
and there was a sharp decline in fund membership, as Figure 2 indicates.
Figure 2. UIF membership in the Nordic countries (%).
UIF: unemployment insurance fund.
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In Denmark, the process has been less abrupt. Contributions were raised somewhat in 
the 1980s and less visibly in a 1998 reform which separated contributions to early retire-
ment from contributions towards unemployment insurance, and in subsequent tightening 
of the provisions for early retirement (Goul Andersen, 2012). Subsequently, contribu-
tions have constituted about 40 percent of paid benefits (Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 
2015). Contributions have remained tax deductible, but the deduction has been lowered 
as an indirect incentive to leave official trade unions.
In Finland, contributions have remained stable at around 5 percent of paid benefits 
(Kela, 2015). However, employees have also paid contributions since 1993 as an ear-
marked tax contribution (0.8% in 2015), and this is set to increase following recent tri-
partite negotiations (Kela, 2015; Lilja and Savaja, 1999; Yle, 2016).
Coverage
Coverage used to be relatively high, at least 70–75 percent of the unemployed in the 
three Scandinavian countries until the 1990s, and around 50 percent in Finland (Lilja and 
Savaja, 1999; Torp, 1999). But since 2000, there has been a steep decline in Sweden 
(Berglund and Esser 2013; Sjöberg 2011). By 2012, it was just below 30 percent of the 
total number of unemployed individuals. In tandem with the increasing number of people 
choosing to opt out of the funds, declining coverage reflects that access for new entrants 
into the labour market (such as students) has been restricted. The eligibility requirement 
for benefits has also been strengthened in Sweden, although Denmark by now has the 
strictest requirement among the Nordic Ghent countries. (In Denmark it is 52 weeks of 
37 hours, in Finland 34 weeks of 18 hours and in Sweden 26 weeks of on average 80 hour 
per month.)
In Denmark, the work requirement was doubled from 26 to 52 weeks of employment 
over the last 3 years in 1995, and a 2010 reform also doubled the requalification require-
ment to 52 weeks (from 2012). This also cut benefit duration from 4 to 2 years. Three 
labour market reforms in 1993–1998 had already cut maximum duration from 9 to 
4 years. However, the reforms of the 1990s occurred when unemployment was falling, 
and the impact on benefit coverage was minor (Goul Andersen, 2011). By contrast, the 
recent changes (from 4 to 2 years coupled with a doubling of the requalification criteria) 
will have more significant long-term effects.
In Finland, the work requirement was raised in 1997, but reduced again to the present 
34 weeks of work within the past 48 weeks. Coverage has remained around 50 percent of 
the unemployed on benefits (Kela, 2015; Lilja and Savaja, 1999). In contrast to Denmark, 
neither Finland nor Sweden has cut maximum duration, retaining limits of 100 and 
60 weeks respectively.
However, all three countries have either abolished or shortened special duration 
extensions for elderly unemployed. Furthermore, in all three countries, benefit duration 
could in practice be nearly unlimited before the 1990s, since participation in various 
active labour market measures counted as ‘work’ when fulfilling the work requirements. 
Both Denmark and Sweden have eliminated this possibility (Kongshøj, 2014). Finland 
has not completely removed such measures from the work criterion, and half of the hours 
worked in a publicly subsidized job are counted as work.
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Unemployment benefits and social assistance
Here, we provide a brief comparison of unemployment benefits and social assistance; for 
a more detailed account, see Kuivalainen and Nelson (2012) or Bahle et al. (2011). Social 
assistance in the Nordic Ghent countries has become less generous over time, as Figure 3 
shows. There are various technical reasons in each country for this development, mainly 
indexation (Kongshøj, 2014; Kuivalainen and Nelson, 2012).
Sweden stands out in several respects: in 2013, it generally had the lowest net replace-
ment rates for both social assistance and unemployment insurance. Furthermore, the 
difference between the two benefits had declined markedly. Where Sweden previously 
had the best incentives for people to enrol in unemployment funds, the difference between 
the two benefits in 2013 is slightly smaller than in the two other countries. Changes were 
less dramatic in Denmark and Finland. The general picture is that the difference between 
unemployment insurance and social assistance remains about the same in the two other 
countries, but also that net replacement rates have declined for both benefit types. 
Denmark has larger incentives for low-paid wage-earners to enrol in unemployment 
insurance, given the high replacement rate below the benefit ceiling.
In short, we have seen how some of the traits that have set Nordic unemployment 
insurance apart have eroded, particularly in Sweden: a frontrunner in terms of reducing 
generosity and coverage of unemployment insurance and also increasing member financ-
ing of benefits. However, some of these quite radical steps have been offset slightly 
within the past 2 years. In Denmark, the decline in generosity and coverage has been less 
dramatic, although there have been drastic cuts in benefit duration (whereas Denmark 
Figure 3. Net replacement rates for unemployment insurance and social assistance (average 
wage), 2001 and 2013.
Data sources: The Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Dataset (SAMIP) (2016); OECD 
(2016c, 2016d).
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used to be very generous as part of its ‘flexicurity model’) and benefit eligibility has 
become less inclusive. Finland has mainly retained a system that already set it apart from 
the other Nordic countries (much more earnings-related benefits with lower coverage). 
Generosity has declined somewhat, although there have also been a few steps in the other 
direction for unemployment insurance.
It is worth noting that these developments have encouraged a market for supplemen-
tary unemployment insurance. Especially in Sweden, but also Denmark in recent years, 
declining benefit generosity has induced unions to extend and finance supplementary 
insurance through collective agreements. These collective, supplementary insurances 
typically raise total benefits to a certain (maximum) replacement level of around 80 per-
cent. In Sweden, these new collectively agreed, supplementary insurance schemes cov-
ered around 40 percent of the labour force in 2014, whereas the share in Denmark was a 
more marginal (7%–8% of the labour force, including individual/private insurance) 
(Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2015; Rasmussen, 2014). This corresponds to the pattern 
outlined below of more radical benefit retrenchment in Sweden. This has not been a 
significant tendency in Finland, probably because, unlike in Sweden and Denmark, there 
is no ceiling on benefits in the publicly financed system.
Introducing independent and alternative UIFs
The introduction of UIFs independent of the main trade unions is a second type of policy 
change affecting union membership. In Finland, the introduction in 1992 of an independ-
ent UIF, YTK, had a severe effect on trade density: Böckerman and Uusitalo (2006) 
demonstrate that this explains around 75 percent of the decline in density from 1993 to 
2002 (11 percentage points). They argue that the right-wing government was not actively 
involved in the creation of the YTK, but the fact that the right-wing parties were in power 
may have made it easier for the fund to be approved by the Ministry of Social Affairs. In 
2006, YTK introduced individual services similar to those of trade unions, such as legal 
aid, at a higher membership fee; this strengthened their position on the Finnish labour 
market as an alternative to the classic dual membership (Asplund, 2007).
In Sweden, the government introduced the Alfa-kassan in 1998 in competition with 
the existing UIF system. Alfa-kassan, like YTK, is an independent fund open to all 
employees and not associated with any trade union. Initially, it was not as successful as 
its Finnish counterpart (Kjellberg, 2006), though in recent years it seems to have become 
more attractive. A compulsory unemployment insurance system, as in Norway, has been 
on the political agenda on several occasions but has never been realized (Kjellberg, 
2009, 2014).
In Denmark, a key policy change came in 2002 when the newly elected liberal–conserv-
ative government adopted ‘the liberation package for the labour market’ (Frihedspakken for 
Arbejdsmarkedet). Part of the original policy rationale was to prevent ‘forced membership’ 
in trade unions, and one potential solution was to establish an alternative, state-run UIF. 
However, the government could not find majority support for this proposed legislation in the 
Parliament (Folketinget) (Høgedahl, 2014). The negotiated compromise was therefore a 
somewhat less drastic but nevertheless pivotal change for the official trade unions. The old 
delineation of the UIFs, organized along sectoral and occupational lines and a central 
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element in the Danish Ghent system since its creation in 1907, was eliminated. Since 2002, 
all UIFs have been able to become interdisciplinary and recruit members from outside their 
own traditional territory (Due and Madsen, 2007; Ibsen et al., 2013; Lind, 2009). This broke 
the de facto monopoly of the official trade unions by opening the market for the interdisci-
plinary UIFs and their associated alternative unions. This institutional change is fundamen-
tal to the success of the alternative unions, since it transformed the nature of the Ghent 
system (Høgedahl 2014b). The 2010 reform also strengthened the incentive to leave a rec-
ognized trade union in favour of an alternative union by applying a ceiling of DKK 3000 
(€400) to the annual tax deduction for union membership dues; the figure was set precisely 
so that members of the official unions would no longer receive a full tax deduction, whereas 
the cheaper alternative unions could continue to do so (Ibsen et al., 2011). Survey research 
shows clearly that this was the main rationale for switching to an alternative trade union 
and UIF (Ibsen et al., 2013). The ceiling was later raised by the social democratic–led 
government in 2014, taking effect in January 2015.
Declining UIF densities
Above, we have outlined the changes made to unemployment insurance benefits and the 
institutional set-up surrounding the Ghent systems in Denmark, Sweden and Finland in 
recent years. We now turn to the outcome of these policy changes in terms of UIF mem-
bership levels. First of all, as Figure 2 shows, Sweden has seen the most severe decline 
especially from 2006 to 2009. This is consistent with the policy changes described. 
Sweden has been a frontrunner in terms of reducing the generosity and coverage of 
unemployment insurance and also increasing employee contributions. The net replace-
ment rates for unemployment insurance and social assistance have also diminished. 
Kjellberg (2009) demonstrates how the reform of unemployment benefits is directly 
linked to declining UIF density. The policy changes have an evident effect on UIF mem-
bership and thereby erode UIFs as a trade union recruitment channel. Especially, the 
dramatic increase in contributions (differentiated across funds according to unemploy-
ment levels) in the 2007 reform introduced a very tangible disincentive to UIF member-
ship. It is also worth noting that Swedish UIF density has stabilized since 2011.
In Denmark, UIF density has also fallen continuously. However, the decline is less 
severe than in Sweden. Whereas UIF membership in Sweden became less attractive 
because of less generous benefits and increased contributions, reforms in Denmark entailed 
stricter eligibility criteria and shorter benefit duration. In spite of these changes, Denmark 
still has relatively large incentives for those with low wages to enrol in a UIF because of 
the high replacement rate up to the benefit ceiling. Previous research shows that especially 
younger workers have a lower UIF density compared to their older colleagues in Denmark 
(Due et al., 2010). The reason for this variation is not clear; however, some studies indicate 
that ignorance may play a key role and that many young workers do not distinguish between 
unemployment benefits and social assistance (Kolstrup, 2006).
Since the independent and alternative UIFs do not contribute to trade union density, it 
is relevant to exclude them from the density statistics, as Figure 4 shows. This changes 
the numbers significantly, and the densities in the three countries from 2010 are much 
closer. The relatively large gap between Sweden and Denmark seen in Figure 2 can thus 
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be explained by the small membership of Alfa-kassan as against the success of the alter-
native UIFs in Denmark. Alfa-kassan increased its membership from 66,598 in 2005 to 
98,717 in 2016. Nevertheless, only 5.7 percent of the total UIF membership consists of 
members of Alfa-kassan. In comparison, the alternatives in Denmark make up 13.7 per-
cent of the total.
In Finland, the density of union-run funds is also declining, because of the continuing 
success of the YTK: from 2004 to 2014, its membership grew from 239,293 to 345,706, 
a 44-percent increase. By comparison, the total UIF density (including YTK members) 
dropped marginally from 75 to 73 percent; or if YTK members are excluded from the 
total, from 66 percent in 2004 to 60 percent in 2014.
We can offer some tentative explanations why the Alfa-kassan has not been as suc-
cessful as its counterpart in Finland, YTK (or the roughly similar institutional equiva-
lents in Denmark). First of all, the more radical retrenchment of public benefits in 
Sweden has been a disincentive to enrol in UIFs in general (and therefore, an incentive 
to opt out of the system rather than changing to an alternative UIF). Second, the expan-
sion of supplementary insurance in Sweden (as mentioned above), driven forward by the 
unions themselves, constitutes a further disincentive against the state-run Alfa-kassan 
since supplementary insurance is not offered here.
Conclusion: new trajectories from the classic Ghent model 
of membership
Our aim has been to provide a comparative analysis of the policy changes made to the 
Nordic Ghent systems in recent years and assess how these institutional changes have 
affected UIF and trade union densities. Our research question has been: ‘Are the 
Figure 4. Membership density in UIFs linked to recognized unions (%).
UIFs: unemployment insurance funds.
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Nordic Ghent countries following different trajectories away from the classic dual 
membership?’
We find a variation in institutional changes between Denmark, Sweden and Finland, 
creating different trajectories away from the ‘classic’ Ghent system. Declining trade 
union density is a common trend, but the severity of this decline varies across the coun-
tries. We find two types of policy change: reforms aimed at reducing the generosity of 
unemployment benefits in terms of compensation levels, duration, eligibility and the 
degree of state subsidy, and reforms allowing new actors to enter the market for UIFs.
In Sweden, the reform of unemployment benefits has created a dual exit from both 
UIFs and trade unions. The independent UIF Alfa-kassan has not been a major success, 
although membership has increased somewhat in recent years. In terms of the combina-
tions illustrated in Table 1, there has been a shift towards cell 9.
In Finland, on the other hand, unemployment benefits have not been retrenched to the 
same extent, but the independent YTK fund introduced in 1992 continues to grow, while 
the membership of the traditional UIFs associated with the labour movement is declin-
ing. Here, the trajectory away from the classic Ghent model points to more single mem-
bers of an independent UIF, as in cell 6.
In Denmark, the policy reform from 2002 allowing UIFs to recruit members from 
outside of their own traditional sectoral or occupational territory has created a market for 
new UIFs and their alternative trade unions, as in cell 5.
In sum, the three Nordic Ghent systems have seen different combinations of two types 
of reform, namely less attractive benefit regimes and new institutional alternatives to the 
union-run funds. In Finland, the independent YTK fund is still the most important factor 
behind the decline in membership rates of UIFs associated with recognized trade unions. 
Total fund membership (including YTK) has been quite stable, and benefits have not 
been retrenched to the same extent as in Denmark and particularly in Sweden. In 
Denmark, the introduction of alternative, cross-sectoral funds is also the most important 
factor, although benefit eligibility and duration also became significantly less ‘generous’ 
in the period. In Sweden, by contrast, declining benefit levels and increased member 
contributions were very significant, and here we have seen a more dramatic decline in 
fund and union membership. Interestingly, the independent UIF Alfa-kassan has not been 
as successful as YTK in Finland and the alternative UIFs in Denmark. Our findings indi-
cate that these differences reflect the variations in the nature of the reforms. The increase 
in employee contributions adversely affected not only the union-linked UIFs but also 
Alfa-kassan. Furthermore, a specific disincentive to join Alfa is that unlike the union-
linked funds it does not offer supplementary insurance. As we have noted, supplemen-
tary insurance now covers nearly half the labour force in Sweden.
Future research based on cross-national surveys would be able to shed more light on 
the new trajectories in unionization in the Nordic Ghent countries in a comparative set-
ting and the dynamics behind these changes. Survey-based research in Denmark indi-
cates that the double opt-out from the classic Ghent system is dominated by blue-collar 
workers between 30 and 40 years old (Høgedahl, 2014). Is this also the case in the other 
Nordic countries? One thing is certain: the Nordic models of industrial relations are 
based on high collective bargaining coverage voluntarily negotiated by the social part-
ners. If the decline in trade union density continues, the labour movements will gradually 
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lose representativeness, legitimacy and eventually power in relation to both their 
employer counterparts and political decision-makers.
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